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Life as Screen ? Or how to grasp the virtuality of the body
In  h e r  b o o k  Life on the Screen, Sherry Turkle assumes th a t the new com puter 
technologies m aterialize »postm odern  theory and  b ring  it down to earth« 
(T urkle 1995, 18) A nd she continues: »Thus, m ore than  twenty years after 
m eetin g  the ideas o f  Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze and  G uattari, I am  m eeting 
them  again in my new life on  the screen. But this time, the Gallic abstractions 
are m ore  concrete . In  my com puter-m ediated  worlds, the self is m ultiple, 
fluid, an d  co n stitu ted  in in teraction  with m achine connections; it is m ade 
an d  transfo rm ed  by language; sexual congress is an exchange o f signifiers; 
a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  follows from  navigation  an d  tin k e rin g  ra th e r  than  
analysis.« (T urkle 1995, 15)
T urk le  is n o t the  only »cyber-theorist« defining the new technologies 
as a k ind  o f m aterialization o r visualization o f som ething previously invisible. 
Kathryn Hayles and  Slavoj Žižek, to nam e bu t two, develop a similiar position 
from  w ithin a L acanian  fram ework. But in doing so, they erase im portan t 
d iffe ren ces . T h e  d iffe ren c e , fo r instance , betw een  a topological an d  a 
descripive n o tion  o f  the unconscious, the difference betw een the O ther and 
the  o th e r, the  d ifference betw een the body and  its unconscious image.
V arious exam ples o f psychoanalytic cybertheories and  (art) practice 
(m edia art, net-projects) dem onstrate this impulse to erase these differences. 
B u t w h en  an  e q u a tio n  is m ad e  b etw een  an  (artis tic) n e tp ra c tic e  an d  
psychoanaly tical theo ry , a crucial d iffe rence is lost, nam ely  th a t w hich 
constitu te  the space o f the  subject.
New T ech n o lo g y  (N T ), it is claim ed, reconstitu tes the subject in a 
fu n d am en ta l way, n o t only effecting his m ental state b u t also and  forem ost 
his body. T h e  new m odes o f percep tion  in troduced  th rough  NT claim to 
b rin g  to an  en d  the  m o d ern  way o f vision and  the corresponding  subject of 
cen tra l perspectivity. B ut the discourse on NT does n o t clearly define the 
su b jec t n o r  is th e  n o tio n  o f vision p laced  u n d e r rigorous scrutiny. W ith 
L acan 's  question  »W hat is a picture« bo th  vision and the seeing subject are 
d e f in e d  in  a ra d ic a lly  d if f e re n t  way. In  my p a p e r  I will w ork  w ith  a 
psychoanalytical defin ition  o f the subject in o rd e r to theorize the otherness 
o r the  novelty o f  the subject o f  NT.
D iscourse ab o u t endings is a t this m om ent very m uch to the point. The
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spectre o f the end o f m edia, esp. mass m edia has b een  raised. T he e n d  o f 
art has also been  prophesized; n o t to m en tion  the im plosion  o f  the pub lic  
realm  and  the underm in ing  o f its ap p a ren t opposition  the  private. T h e  en d  
o f the subject has been  invoked again, on  this occasion includ ing  the e n d  o f 
gender. In  addition  a lam ent for the passing o f  the  h u m an  b e in g  has b een  
intoned.
Such talk o f endings leads naturally  to a consideration  o f beginnings. 
It presupposes a beginning which is e ither ontogenetically o r phylogenetically 
defined, o r  an  inaugauration  o f a co n ju n c tu re  betw een  specific h istorical 
epochs and  psychical stages.
I have suggested  the title  »Life as S creen?« in  o rd e r  to  evoke th e  
question o f those endings and  their co rrespond ing  beginnings, as well as to 
pose the question o f what and who com es to an  end . L acan’s question »W hat 
is a p icture« , which he posed  in his Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psycho- 
Analysis, was from the beginning essentially im plicated with the question what 
is a subject. My question here  will be w hich subject Lacan has in view an d  
how it relates to the discourse o f NT.
I shall begin with a short extract from  M arge Piercy’s novel Body o f Glass 
(1992). In  the following scene Shira, a p ro g ram m e r, en c o u n te rs  Jo d , a 
cyborg:
»She w ondered  exactly w hat one  d id  with a cyborg. She h ad  w aded  
th rough  gigabytes o f m aterial on  his hardw are, b u t she was still confused. 
Could one  kiss a cyborg? W ould n o t his m o u th  be  dry as an  can opener?  It 
was not. His lips were soft on  hers. His tongue was a little sm o o th er th an  a 
h um an  tongue b u t moist. Everything was sm oo ther, m ore  regu la r, m ore  
nearly perfect. T he skin o f his back was n o t like the  skin o f  o th e r  m en  she 
had been with, for always there were abrasions, pim ples, scars, irregularities. 
His skin was sleek as a w om an’s b u t d rie r to the  touch , w ithou t the pillow o f 
subcutaneous fat.« (Piercy 1992, 227)
After initially hesitating to begin a sexual re lation  with Jo d , Shira com es 
to be overw helm ed with his perfection to the  p o in t th a t she cou ld  no  longe 
ignore h e r own h um an  defects. Jo d  continually  pursues h e r  with questions 
a b o u t w hat it is like to be a h u m a n  w om an. S h ira  b ec am e  ev e r m o re  
uncertain  abou t the advantage o f being  h u m an  an d  the  essential d ifference 
betw een h um an  and  non  hum an.
A question raises itself here: w ether in the  co n tex t o f  the  e n c o u n te r  
between the technological, the m achinic an d  the non-hum an the precarious 
nature o f the centered hum an subject, to which Descartes drew  ou r atten tion , 
has becom e m anifest.
L acan 's m editations are germ ane to this issue. H e a rg u ed  historically
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th a t the Ego (an d  I m ean  here  the ego and no t the subject) is n o t only a 
precarious psychic s tru c tu re  b u t also a fragile socio-historical accom plish­
m ent. T h e  tragedy o f this subject, to p u t in its fully pathetic  dim ension, is 
th a t  in  o rd e r  to avoid losing  itself in  its en v iro n m en t, it m ust erase all 
d ifference betw een itself an d  its surroundings. (Cf. B rennan  1993, 4 ff.)
T h e  ten o r o f the theorists of the new technologies is that this subject 
has com e to  a total end . In  the epoch  o f the hum an interface there  is no 
m ore place for C artesian dualisms: Instead n a tu re /cu ltu re , b o d y /m in d  as 
well as m a le /fem a le  are  transform ed in to  technical questions in the sense 
th a t they are only tem porarily  fixed through  a coupling o f the hum an  with 
the  m achine. (Cf. Poster 1995)'
D onna Haraw ay’s cyborg illustrates this new hybrid form  o f being, half 
e lec tron ic , h a lf biological, b u t also historically constitu ted . A ccording to 
Haraway the cyborg arises at historical m om ents o f social transition; times 
o f  ra d ic a l u n c e r ta in ty  w h en  b o rd e rs  a re  b ro k en  o r  u n d e r  th rea t, an d  
trad itonal strategies o f draw ing boundaries no  longer function: m om ents 
such  as th e  p re s e n t w h en  th e  d istinc tion  betw een m an  an d  cybernetic 
organism s are b reak ing  down. (cf. Haraway 1990) In this con tex t Haraway 
draws p articu lar a tten tio n  to the porosity o f bodily boundaries, in particular 
the  skin. A ccording to F reud  the skin is a key elem ent in the construction of 
the Ego as such. It follows that the bodily interface is not only a question of the 
N T bu t also, from  a psychoanalytic perspective, the quesion o f the subject itself.
T hus, w hen Lacan refers to a historical form ation o f the Ego he m eans 
this in a thorough ly  m aterial-bodily sense. This historically unfolding Ego -  
a social-psychotic figuration  — m ust physically dem arcate the boundaries o f 
its body.
In  the n ex t section I move from  considering the historical Ego to an 
ex p lo ra tio n  o f the psychic subject, a subject which accord ing  to L acan’s 
theo ry  o f the  m irro r stage, is always an d  already at war n o t only with its 
env ironm en t, b u t also an d  especially with itself, and with its im age which is 
always o th e red , an d  to w hich it can never be reconciled.
The excess of the image
Lacan re la tes th e  em b attled  status o f the subject to narcissism. T he 
subject n e ith e r loves its im age nor is beloved by it, bu t ra th e r loves that which
1 This is, of course, only one dominant strand in discourses on the NT. The other strand 
signals the fullfillment of the Enlightenment conception of the subject. (Cf. Penny 
1994, Žižek 1997)
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exceeds the image. T he subject loves the p ic tu re 's  excess, a p ic tu re  b eh in d  
the picture. This »behind-the-picture« is the ideal-ego, th a t psychic function  
in which the child exists as its own ideal or, to p u t it m o re  correctly , will 
have becom e its own ideal retrospectively. As Lacan m akes the p o in t, the 
ideal-ego is that p o in t »at which he [th e  subject] desires to gratify h im self 
in himself«. (Lacan 1981, 257) O r as h e  defines it elsew here: »T hat w here 
the subject sees himself, namely, w here th a t real, inverted  im age o f his own 
body that is given in the schem a o f the ego is forged, it is n o t from  th ere  th a t 
he  looks a t himself.« (Lacan 144)
H ere a distinction appears betw een the  eye an d  the  gaze w hich will be 
im p o rtan t to us in what follows.
The basis o f this distinction is F reu d ’s d ifferen tiation  betw een the drive 
and the instinct. T hrough this radical d ifferentiation, w hich F reud an d  Lacan 
were never tired  o f invoking, the no tion  o f  prim al lack is in tro d u ced . This 
lack is the p ro p e r place o f the subject. For the rest o f  his life the  sub ject will 
h au n t and  be haun ted  by this lack, w hich takes form  in his im age, befo re  
his image, b eh in d  his image.
The drama o f being part of the picture
Lacan has associated this overdeterm ined split (Spaltung) between drive 
and  instinct, ideal-ego an d  egoideal, eye an d  gaze w ith th e  constitu tive  
function o f prim al aggression. He explains this aggression in term s o f  an  
unusual concep t o f mimesis as an intransitive resem blance in w hich th e re  is 
no  resem bled  object.
Lacan adapts this concep t from  R oger Callois’s w ork on  the  m im etic 
capacity o f insects. A ccording to Callois the  tendency  o f insects to take on 
the co lour o f their background is n o t to be  u n d ers to o d  as self-protection or 
flight from  an aggressor bu t ra ther as an  a ttem p t to becom e p art o f  a picture. 
As M ichael Taussig puts it in »Mimesis an d  Alterity« it is a m atte r o f  being  
seduced by space, a spacing out o f  the self, a d ram a »in w hich the self is b u t 
a self-diminishing po in t am id others, losing its boundedness.«  (Taussig 1995, 
34)
W hereas animals h u n t each o th e r th ro u g h  the  sense o f smell, m im icry 
arises in the field o f seeing. It signals a fa ilu re to m ain ta in  the b o u n d ary  
between in n e r and  outer, between the body and  its env ironm en t, o r as Jo an  
C op jec  d e fin e s  it, b e tw een  »an u n c o n s c io u s  b e in g  a n d  a c o n sc io u s  
semblance«. T he effect of mimicry o r the effect o f rep resen ta tion , as Copjec 
argues, does n o t place the subject in »happy accord  with the reality« b u t
156
Life as Screen ? Or how to grasp the virtuality of the body
ra th e r  in d u ces the  »suspicion th a t som e reality is b e in g  cam ouflaged«. 
(Copjec 1995, 37) In  response to such representation -  mimicry, the subject’s 
ow n b e in g  b re a k s  u p  b e tw e en  the  u n co n sc io u s  b e in g  an d  consc ious 
sem blance. As Lacan m akes the  point: »To im itate is no  d o u b t to rep roduce 
an  im age. B ut a t bo ttom , it is, for the subject, to be inserted  in a function 
whose exercise grasps it.« (Lacan 100)
Picture and gaze do not meet
How do these considerations bear on the question o f N T ’s, m ourn ing  
for the  subject an d  the hym n to a new »fluid and  polym orphic structu re  o f 
identity«?
At the en d  o f the Four Fundamental Concepts Lacan surprisingly m entions 
w hat he  says we can call the »mass media«. H e indicates th a t it is tem pting  
to see these m ed ia  as augm en tin g  the society o f the spectacle, to use Guy 
D eb o rd 's  term . Instead, he claims, they contribu te to a diffusion o f the gaze 
an d  the voice, b u t he  m akes n o  fu rther com m ent on this m atter.
I shall a ttem p t to re la te  this diffusion of the gaze to the  novelty o f the 
N T specifically in o rd e r  to follow up  the question o f the »location o f the 
subject«.
In his book  Techniques o f the Observer (1995) Jo n a th an  Crary argues that 
N T are new  insofar as they o p era te  w ithout a p o in t of view, that is w ithout a 
place which the  viewer can occupy. Thus the cam era obscura m odel with its 
centrally focussed perspective is underm ined. And this, Crary observes, m ight 
poten tially  have fatal consequences for the subject and  m ight fo reg round  
in co n c re te  fashion the spectacle of its fragility.
As I already no ted , Lacan defines the Ego as historically and psychically 
always already precarious. H e has em phasized this precarious status through 
his d istinc tion  betw een the Subject and  the Ego, echo ing  the split between 
eye an d  the gaze, a gaze w hich poposes an  impossible location which canno t 
be occup ied  by the  subject.
By th in k in g  to g e th e r these two im possibe locations, the co m p u te r­
generated  one m en tioned  by jonathan  Crary, and the psychic one considered 
by Lacan, I p ro p o se  to b rin g  to g eth er the radical ex teriority  o f bo th  the 
techn ical and  psychic stru c tu ra tio n  o f the subject.
In o rd e r to u n d ertak e  this thinking together I will criticize two strands 
o f th o u g h t in m edia  theory: on  the one hand, Screen an d  A pparatus theory, 
w hich b o th  focus u p o n  the  im age, the screen, and  their equation  with the 
m irro r. A nd o n  the  o th e r a sim ilar equation  o f the m irro r with the m on ito r
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within the discourse on  NT. In the latter discourse the m on ito r is u n derstood  
as a m irro r and  virtual reality is conceived  as th e  space o f  th e  L acan ian  
im aginary.
At the center o f film theory lies the m odel o f the Lacanian m irro r stage 
as an original m isrecognition o f the subject in the im age o f »an-other«. Both 
A p p ara tu s  th eo ry  (B audry, C om olli, M etz) a n d  B ritish  S c reen  th eo ry  
(Mulvey, H eath , W ollen) take over L acan 's  theo ry  o f the  m irro r stage in 
o rd e r to identify the screen as a m irro r befo re  w hich o r b e tte r  in  w hich the 
subject misrecognizes itself. In this taking over, the L acanian m irro r stage is 
subjected to an overgeneralization which is fatally repeated  in the field o f NT.
I w an t to  d e m o n s tra te  this b rie fly  by d iscu ssin g  Kaja S ilv e rm an 's  
defin ition  o f the gaze as a cultural gaze.
According to Lacan, in the re la tion  betw een the m irro r im age an d  the 
child a th ird  elem ent intervenes, the  gaze o f the  m o ther. In the  sam e way, 
accord ing  to Baudry, in the re la tio n  betw een  th e  screen  im age a n d  the  
spectator a th ird  elem ent is involved, w hich Baudry like Lacan identifies as 
a gaze. This th ird  e lem en t makes possible an d  guaran tees the identification  
between the child and  the m irror im age as well as tha t between the spectator 
and  the screen image. In the case o f  the  cinem a, Baudry argues, this th ird  
elem ent is the gaze associated with the  cam era.
I now w ant to re tu rn  to the question  o f the split betw een the eye an d  
the gaze ab o u t which Lacan says: »I see only from  o n e  p o in t, b u t in  my 
existence I am  looked at from  all sides.« (Lacan 72) We are, h e  con tinues, 
»beings who are looked at, in the spectacle o f  the  world. (...) Is th e re  no  
satisfaction in being u n d er that gaze (...) tha t circum scribes us, an d  which 
in the first instance makes us beings who are looked  at, b u t w ithou t showing 
this?« (Lacan 75)
In a conscious waking state this function  o f the  gaze is usually elided , 
b u t shows itself only in special m om ents (Lacan m entions the  im ages o f the 
dream , paintings etc.). In  o th er w ords, the  gaze is th a t w hich is invisible. 
This is also the m o m en t th ro u g h  w hich  th e  ab sen ce  o f  th e  sign ified  is 
m anifested. T he gaze does n o t acknow ledge the subject, it does n o t look, 
b u t ra th e r causes a disturbance, a topp ling  o f the subject. This gaze unfolds 
itself in the place o f the O th er and enables the  ch ild ’s first iden tification  at 
the cost o f an  originary alienation: »The gaze is som eth ing  from  w hich the 
subject has separated  itself off, b u t w hich was once  p a rt o f  th e  subject; it  is 
thus an object petit a.« (Cowie 1997, 288)
Silverman takes up this difference between the eye2 and  gaze in asserting 
that the gaze does n o t look, that in this sense it is m isleading even to re fer to
2 In Silverman’s considerations the eye is the look, the bodily context of the eye, the
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it as a gaze. N evertheless in  h e r  subsequen t argum ents she indicates, in 
explicit re feren ce  to Lacan, th a t the gaze is in a m etaphoric  relation to the 
ca m e ra . T h e  on ly  fu n c tio n  o f  this c in em atic  a p p a ra tu s , a cco rd in g  to 
Siverman, is to pu t the subject in the picture. How this »being in the picture«, 
this »being p h o to g rap h ed « , how this operates is no t a function  o f the gaze, 
b u t ra th e r the co n cern  o f  the  »cultural screen«. W hile the gaze represents 
th e  p re sen ce  o f  th e  o th e rs  as such, it is the  func tion  o f the eye-look to 
d e te rm in e  th e  d irec tio n  o f  m ean ing  p roduc tion , th a t is to decide which 
aspects are  m obilized in / th ro u g h  being pho tographed . Thus the eye-look 
becom es the place in  w hich the  im aginary subject encounters the almighty 
gaze. In  this co n tex t th e re  is a ded ifferen tia tion  of the gaze and  the  eye 
th ro u g h  the m ed iation  o f the »cultural screen«. T he gaze as cultural gaze 
becom es the site o f  socio-cultural power which leads individuals in to  their 
respective m odes o f being.
T h e  defin ition  o f the  gaze as an anonym ous societal look in the sense 
o f  the  Foucau ld ian  p an o p tico n  resurfaces in m odified form  in the analysis 
o f the  NT.
In  this co n tex t the  co m p u ter m onito r is assimilated to the m irro r and  
the  elec tron ic  space is taken as a m aterialization o f the unconscious. In  this 
respect, then , it is the ideal ego which greets us in cyberspace.
T o consider these claims, I shall briefly consider two exam ples, taken 
from  K athryn Hayles an d  Slavoj Žižek.
V irtual reality, Žižek writes, renders explicit that m echanism  which until 
now  has b een  h id d en  b u t was always and already foundational to the subject. 
A nd Kathryn Hayles claims in connection with cyberspace that it materializes 
the  L acanian  m irro r stage. L acan 's im aginary is thus given a th reed im en­
sional physical reality. T h a t is, the im aginary is m ade real in the sense o f a 
tech n o lo g ica l p ro d u c tio n . W hereas Hayles equates the  im aginary  with 
physicality, she in troduces the  symbolic through equating it with the virtual, 
i.e. the  e lec tro n ic  p ro d u ced  d ata  realm  o r da ta  space. T hus, she argues, 
»cyberspace rep resen ts  a pow erful challenge to the custom ary construction 
o f the body’s boundaries, open ing  them  to transform ing configurations that 
always bear the trace o f  the O ther. The resulting disorientation can function 
as a wedge to destabilize presuppositions abou t self and the O ther.«  (Hayles 
1993, 187)
As is well know n, Lacan makes a distinction betw een the (lower case) 
»other« an d  the  (capital) »O ther«, a distinction which Žižek equates with 
the d ifference betw een the ideal ego and  the ego-ideal as well as betw een
look as bodily spectacle, which is to a certain extent resistant to the gaze. (Cf. Silverman 
1996,137 ff.)
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symbolic and  im aginary identification. W hereas the re la tio n  with the  o th e r  
is im aginary in  the sense tha t the self resem bles the o th e r, the  re la tio n  with 
the O ther is symbolic, that is, depends on  the structure o f language. Symbolic 
identification is identification with the O th er, the place from  w here we see 
ourselves as likeable. This place o f the  O th er, th e  symbolic o rd e r, carries 
within it a kernel, a Thing (das D ing), a void w hich the subject m ust conceal. 
T hat is, this gaze from  the place o f the  O th e r is n o t a gaze in a full sense. 
Rather, it is an em pty gaze, by w hich the  subject is h a u n te d  an d  feels itself 
observed, b u t nevertheless for whom the  subject wants to »play a role«, as 
Žižek poin ts out. Both identifications — the im aginary  an d  the  sym bolic — 
are n o t strictly separab le  because im ag inary  id en tif ic a tio n  is always an  
»identification on behalf of a certain gaze in the Other«. (Žižek 1994, 106)
In  H ay le’s considera tions o f th e  »M irro r o f  th e  C yborg«, thus th e  
L acan ian  O th e r  slides very over in to  c o n c re te  o th e rs . C y b ersp ace  is 
u n d e r s to o d  as o ffe r in g  a w hole ra n g e  o f  p o ss ib ilitie s  to  in te ra c t ,  to  
com m unicate with »other people«. A ccording to Hayles, the se lf  s boundaries 
have to denigrate  their outside. T hus w om en are co n stru c ted  as castrated  
m en, blacks as in ferior whites, etc. T h e  m irro r (o f the  cyborg ), by con trast, 
conflates self and O ther, thus en tailing  new  en co u n te rs  w here the O th e r »is 
accepted as both  d ifferen t and enriching«. (Hayles 188) T h e  p u p p e t on the 
screen , th e  avatar, thus carries th e  » p o ten tia l to  b ec o m e  m o re  th an  a 
puppet, rep resen ting  instead a zone o f in te rac tio n  th a t opens the subject to 
the exhilirating realization o f O therness valued as such.« (188)
H ere  it becom es clear, th a t b o th  the  L acan ian  m irro r stage an d  his 
concep t o f the O th e r have lost their m eaning . T h e  O th er, as the  site from  
which the subject is spoken, has b een  red u ced  to m ulticu ltu ra l an d  social 
differences.
And even Žižek takes on a som ew hat mystical tone w hen discussing the 
in c re as in g  co m p u te riza tio n . H e like so m any  o th e rs  asks h im se lf  th e  
apocalyptic question w hether it is possible th a t the  en d  o f sexuality a n d  the  
end  o f the  hum an  subject are at h an d  th ro u g h  the  em erg en ce  o f  the  PC. 
(Cf. Žižek 1996, 284)
According to him , a confusion arises with the  advent o f the co m p u ter, 
one which reactivates a stage before orig inary  loss, befo re  the  split betw een 
ideal ego an d  ego-ideal.
T h e  e n d  o f sexuality as Žižek describes it, is in tro d u c e d  th ro u g h  a 
p artnersh ip  with a post o r non-hum an  being. H ere  the story betw een Shira 
a n d jo d , which I m entioned  in the beginning , is relevant. T h ro u g h  this n o n ­
h u m an  b ein g  in to  which the sub ject is so to  speak  locked , a p rim o rd ia l 
asexual stage of being is achieved, a stage befo re  any sexual m ark ing  an d
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there fo re  befo re  subjectivity. Žižek illustrates this in term s of the possibilities 
the n e t offers for g en d er switching and creating new bodies: »What fascinates 
people far m ore than  the unpreceden ted  access to inform ation, the new ways 
o f  learn ing , shopp ing , and  so on, is the possibility o f constitu ting  'v irtual 
co m m u n itie s , in w hich I am  free to assum e an arb itra ry  sexual, e thn ic , 
religious, etc., identity. A gay male, for exam ple, can en te r  a closed sexual 
com m unity  and , via the exchange o f messages, partic ipate in a fictionalized 
g ro u p  sexual activity as a heterosexual woman.« (Žižek 1996, 285)
Žižek concludes that these encounters represent the absolute fulfillment 
o f th e  C artesian  subject, because all features (of the sub ject’s identity) are 
con tingen t and  interchangeable. In his description of changing o n e ’s identity 
on the  net, Žižek equates sexual identity with ethnic and  religious identity. 
T hus h e  conflates the decisive difference between the »role o f gender«  and 
the »imperative o f sex«. A ccording to Charles Shepherdson, sexual difference 
in co n trast to g en d e r roles is n o t a »hum an convention, like dem ocracy o r 
m onarchy , a social form  th a t was invented at som e p o in t in historical time, 
a  c o n tin g e n t fo rm a tio n  th a t one  cu ltu re  p ro d u c ed , b u t  th a t  m ig h t be 
rep laced  by a n o th e r  form«. (Shepherdson  1994, 160) R ather it has to be 
seen  as the  effect o f  the  drive which Freud has strictly d istinguished from  
the  instinct. G en d er d ifference, by contrast, is tied to rep resen ta tion , to the 
symbolic o rd er, to the call o f the O th er and  his desire.
T o em phasize the im perative o f sexual difference m eans to insist upon  
the structu ra l inevitability o f  represen ta tion  for hum an sexuality. This does 
n o t im ply a re tu rn  to  a  bodily  n a tu re  or a natu ra l body b u t ra th e r  is an 
in d ic a t io n  th a t  s e x u a lity  (a c c o rd in g  to  b o th  F re u d  a n d  L acan ) is 
c o m p re h e n d e d  n e i th e r  as g e n d e r  n o r  sex, an d  th e  bo d y  n e ith e r  as a 
biological fact n o r a social construct, bu t rather as constitutively denaturalized 
»organ-ized by the im age and  the word«. (Shepherdson 1994, 170)
U p o n  en try  to the symbolic order, the subject is o rganized in term s o f 
a b in ary  o p p o s itio n , e i th e r  having  o r being  the  Phallus. T h e  O th e r  is 
im plicated  in this re la tion  in the sense that the subject wants e ith e r to have 
o r be fo r the O ther. T he question o f which position will b e /c a n  be taken up  
d ep en d s u p o n  the  desire o f the O ther. As such switching betw een g ender 
p o sitions is on ly  possib le  to a lim ited  ex ten t. T h at is, the  phan tasm atic  
exchange o f sexual positions is always accomplished from an already relatively 
fixed position . This applies equally to Žižek’s phantasies as to o th e r stories 
o f g en d e r exchange on  the n e t such as Sherry T urk le’s. As Elizabeth Cowie 
m akes the point: »The ap p a ren t mobility of sexual fantasy, w hether enacted  
o r im agine, can only arise with a — relative — fixing of the subject’s position 
o f sexual d ifference an d  its identifications.« (Cowie 1997, 248)
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The earlier m entioned connection between the field o f vision and  sexual 
difference »takes place« on the level o f  the  drive. D ue to the  sp lit betw een 
the eye an d  the gaze it is »in which the drive is m anifested  a t th e  level o f  the 
scopic field«. (Lacan 73) T he way in w hich Lacan defines m asculinity  and  
feminity coincides with this split to th e  ex ten t th a t the two sexes o r b e tte r  
th e ir ap p e a ra n ce  in the sym bolic o rd e r , involve a sim iliar s tru c tu re  o f 
deception , o f  m asquerade.
Lacan takes the reality o f the unconscious as a sexual reality, w hich has 
no  representation o f masculinity and  feminity. T h e ir d ifference appears only 
in the symbolic o rder as a m asquerade which has to conceal its fun d am en ta l 
loss. A loss which is n o t a sexually m arked  loss, b u t ra th e r  refers, as Lacan 
says, to »the relation  between the living subject an d  th a t w hich h e  loses by 
having to pass, for his reproduction , th ro u g h  the sexual cycle.« ( Lacan 199) 
The fact that masculinity and feminity have to m im ic this loss, to conceal 
it in a m asquerade, can now be identified with the dialectic re la tion  betw een 
the  eye an d  the gaze. T h a t is, b o th  re la tio n s  b e a r  u p o n  a fu n d a m e n ta l 
s tru c tu re  o f  d ec ep tio n . D esc rib in g  love L acan  h im se lf  has m a d e  this 
com parison.
»When in love, I solicit a look, what is profoundly unsatisfying and  always 
m issing is th a t -  You never look at me from the place from which I  see you.« (Lacan 
103) A nd with respect to the field o f vision he  continues:
»Conversely, what I  look at is never what I  wish to see. (...) A triumph o f the 
gaze over the eye.« (Lacan 103)
W hat I have said, suggests tha t m edia  apparatuses such as film an d  NT, 
each in th e ir d ifferen t way, conceal this m asquerade, in  the  sense th a t they 
m ake the subject believe h im /h e rse lf  to be  p a rt o f  the  p icture . O n e  now 
could speculate abou t N T ’s d ifferen t m odes o f  concealing  th an  film ’s.
In sum, in order to theorize the end  o f the m odern  subject, and  relatedly 
the end  o f art and  m edia, as well as to u n d e rs ta n d  the  novelty o f  NT, it is 
necessary to define the notion  o f the subject o n e  is talk ing about. M erely to 
state tha t N T underm ine Cartesian dualism s an d  its gender-m arked  subject 
trivializes th e  issue. I t is also m is le ad in g  to  e q u a te  th e  su b je c t o f  th e  
unconscious with the social o ther in the net, as Kathryn Hayles does echo ing  
the »cultural screen« as in troduced  by Kaja Silverm an. In Žižek’s ap p ro ach  
the O th e r is excluded in NT. But as H enry  Krips m ade the  p o in t -  isn ’t the 
O ther in the case of the net a prosthetic O th er (a cruel superego) from  which 
pleasure can  be derived. And isn ’t this fu n c tio n  taken  over by the  virtual 
com m unity  o f th e  users? In his m ore  re c e n t analysis -  in  th e  P lague o f  
Fantasies (1997) -  Žižek argues that w hat h ap p en s in VR is the  fo reclosure 
o f  th e  rea l. T his com es very close to  w h a t I am  a rg u in g : th a t  m e d ia
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apparatuses are  m eans o f concealing the void. T he question, then, is in what 
d iffe ren t ways N T b lurs the  line betw een the subject and  the user? M ore 
specifically, w hat drives th e  subject, so tha t his location, which is strictly 
speak ing  a non-location , can be  encom passed -  as im age, before the im age 
an d  b e h in d  the  im age. O r to p u t it in a slightly d iffe ren t way: ... in-between 
time after before but before after.
This phrase by Brian Massumi, then, marks the bridge between the body 
(as such) an d  the rep resen ta tiona l body and  m ight therefore  be taken as an 
im age to th ink  with, to th ink  o f the relation between the body and its various 
stages o f virtuality.
Thanks to Henry Krips for stimulating disscussions and the translation. 
Notes
B audry, J.-L. (1980) »Ideological Effects o f the Basic C inem atograph ic  
A pparatus«, in T. C ha APPARATUS. Cinematographic Apparatus: Selected 
Writings. New York: T anam  Press.
B ren n an , T. (1993) History After Lacan. L ondon, New York: Routledge. 
C opjec, J. (1995) Read my Desire. Lacan against the Historicists. C am bridge 
(M ass.), L ondon: M IT Press.
C ow ie, E. (1997) Representing the Woman: Cinema and  Psychoanaylsis.
M inneapolis: University o f M innesota Press.
Crary, J . (1995) Techniques o f the Observer. On Vision and Modernity in the 
Nineteenth Century. C am bridge (Mass.), London: M IT Press.
Haraway, D. (1990) »A M anifesto for Cyborgs. Science, Technology, and 
S ocialist F em in ism  in  th e  1980s«, in  L. N icho lson  (ed .) Feminism/ 
Postmodernism. New York, London: Routledge.
Hayles, N.K. (1993) »The Seductions o f Cyberspace«, in V. A. Conley (ed.) 
Rethinking Technologies. M inneapolis, London: University o f  M innesota 
Press.
Lacan, J. (1981) The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psycho-Analysis. New York, 
L ondon : W.W. N orton  & Company.
Penny, S. (1994) »Virtual Reality as the Com pletion o f the E nligh tenm ent 
P ro jec t« , in  G. B e n d e r  & T. D ruckrey  (eds.) Culture on the Brink. 
Ideologies o f Technology. Seattle: Bay Press.
Piercy, M. (1992) Body of Glass. H am ondsw orth, M iddlesex (UK): Penguin 
Books.
163
Marie-Luise Angerer
Poster, M. (1995) »Postm odern Virtualities«, Body &  Society, vol. 1, no . 3-4, 
79-96.
S hepherdson , C. (1994) »The R oleot G en d er and  the  Imperative o f  Sex«, in 
J. Copjec (ed.) Supposing the Subject. L o ndon , New York: Verso. 
Silverman, K. (1996) On the Threshold o f the Visible World. New York, L ondon : 
Routledge.
Taussig, M. (1993) Mimesis and Alterity. A  Particular History o f the Senses. New 
York, London: Routledge.
Turkle, S. (1995) Life on the Screen. New York: S im on & Schuster.
Žižek, S. (1994) The Sublime Object o f Ideology. L o ndon , New York: Verso. 
Žižek, S. (1996) »Lacan with quan tum  physics«, in G. R obertson  e t al. (eds.)
Future Natural. Nature/science/culture. L o ndon , New York: R outledge. 
Žižek, S. (1997) The Plague o f Fantasies. L o ndon , New York: Verso.
164
